We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject learns about the sanctions received in the same round as they were assigned, but in the SECRET sanctions treatment, sanctions are announced only after the experiment is …nished, removing in this way all strategic reasons to punish. We …nd that sanctioning is similar in both treatments, giving support for nonstrategic explanations of sanctions (altruistic punishment). Interestingly, contributions to the public good in both treatments with sanctioning are higher than when the public goods game is played without any sanctioning, irrespective of announcing the sanctions to their receivers during the play of the game, or only after the game is …nished. The mere knowledge that sanctions might be assigned increases cooperation: subjects correctly expect that nonstrategic sanctioning takes place against freeriders. JEL Classi…cation: C72, C92, D74.
Introduction
The e¢ cacy of sanctioning in sustaining cooperation is well-documented in the experimental literature (Ostrom et al. 1992 dilemmas (public goods or common pool resource games) and parametrization thereof, experimental subjects are willing to incur costs in order to decrease payo¤ of others. Importantly, these payo¤ sanctions a¤ect behavior in the social dilemmas and give rise to stable, or even over time increasing, cooperation.
Due to the impact of sanctions on behavior, we strive to understand the mechanisms that underlie sanctioning (see also Falk et al., 2005) . Negative emotions held towards freeriders are hypothesized to be the proximate mechanism that sustains this outwardly costly behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) . Hence, the decision to assign a sanction is suggested to be nonstrategic. Not a result of a strategic and payo¤-maximizing choice, it is commonly referred to in the literature as altruistic punishment. Indeed, Hopfensitz and Reuben (2005) provide evidence that self-reported emotions of anger are related to the punishment decisions. Also, there is evidence on the neurological processes underlying sanctioning. Quervain et al. (2004) measure brain activation patterns and relate sanctioning to the anticipated grati…cation. This evidence on pleasurable emotions related to sanctioning explains why (some) subjects are willing to incur its material costs. In view of this evidence, there is little doubt that altruistic punishment does exist.
Nevertheless, we should be aware that sanctioning could also be motivated by strategic considerations. Here we have in mind a rational, payo¤-maximization-guided decision to assign a sanction for freeriding in a repeated game in order to manipulate the beliefs of others about the future consequences of free-riding. 1 Under the prevailing uncertainty about the preferences of other players, including the uncertainty about the presence of individuals willing to sanction for nonstrategic reasons, a rational, money-maximizing subject might …nd it pro…table to impose sanctions early in the game in order to generate the expectation that altruistic punishers are present in the interaction, and that free-riding will be sanctioned. The short-run costs incurred in this way might be compensated by longrun increase of cooperation by players trying to avoid sanctioning. Note that the observed sanctioning in repeated social dilemma games, which typically takes place in the initial periods of interaction, upon which the cooperation levels increase/sanctioning decreases, would be in line with non-strategic as well as strategic explanations of sanctioning. The nonstrategic explanations are supported by the fact that sanctions are found even in true one-shot interactions (Walker and Halloran, 2004) Understanding the origins of sanctioning motivations is urgently relevant for the design of institutions which rely heavily on peer sanctioning, and where the working of centralized enforcement is precluded (e.g. micro…nance, see Besley and Coate, 1995) . If sanctions are prevailing strategic, then aspects that promote strategic reasoning should be stimulated (e.g. small groups, long-run interaction, information on the consequences of free-riding behavior). If, on contrary, sanctions are largely nonstrategic, we should learn more about the primitive mechanisms sustaining the peer sanctioning system (e.g. the role of emotions, relation to pro-social preferences).
In our paper, we therefore revisit a standard repeated public goods game with sanctioning in order to study whether the observed sanctioning can be related to the strategic management of the beliefs of other players, or whether it is nonstrategic and insensitive to possible long-run bene…ts associated with the initial investment into sanctioning.
We disentangle the strategically and non-strategically motivated sanctions by setting-up an experiment with two treatments. Sanctioning is available in both of them, and in the STANDARD treatment, the sanctions assigned to a subject are revealed to her in the same round in which they were assigned. Contrary to that, in our main SECRET sanctions treatment, a subject is informed on the sanctions received in each round of interaction only at the end of the experiment. We argue that in this treatment, all strategic motivations for sanctioning are removed. Any remaining sanctioning is due to nonstrategic motivations, and not a result of a short-run cost vs. long run bene…t payo¤-maximization strategy. We compare the behavior in the two treatments in order to assess the relevance of strategic sanctioning in repeated public goods games.
A similar quest for disentangling strategic and nonstrategic (emotional) motivations of sanctioning can be found in the earlier work by Abbink et al. (2004) 2 , and by Casari and Luini (2006) . In both of these papers, actions of the subjects are restricted: Abbink et al.
(2004) restrict the options to cooperate by using mini-ultimatum game, and additionally, the ultimatum game structure limits the sanctioning opportunities as well; Casari and Luini (2006) use public goods game with more complex sequential sanctioning stage in order to isolate the strategic motives. Moreover, the conclusions drawn in these two papers are contradictory. Abbink et al. …nd evidence in favor of strategic sanctioning, while Casari and Luini conclude that sanctions are mostly nonstrategic. In view of this scarce and contradictory evidence, the role the strategic sanctioning plays in a repeated public goods game is unclear.
The experiment reported here has the advantage of studying a standard public goods game, without restricting subjects'action choices to binary strategy sets (possibly avoiding randomization or opening a role for subjects'risk preferences), or by increasing the complexity of the sanctioning stage. We keep the sanctioning options constant across both treatments of the standard linear public goods game, and the only aspect that differs across the two treatments is whether a sanction (if any) can have an immediate impact on the behavior. Subjects can choose any level of cooperation, restricted by their endowments and integer contributions only, allowing in this way for small changes in the cooperation levels. In this way, we hope to shed more light on the relevance of strategic and nonstrategic motives of sanctioning in repeated interactions, as well as on the dynamics of cooperation under the threat of being sanctioned, whether this threat has an imminent or a delayed form.
Our …ndings support nonstrategic explanation of sanctioning in the repeated public goods game. We …nd that sanctioning takes place in both treatments, and similar lev-2 Abbink et al. (2004) also used design comparing treatments where feedback on a co-player's action in a two-player game is either observed in each round, or at the end of the experiment only. els of freeriding in the public goods game are punished in a similar extent, whether the sanctions are or are not immediately announced to the sanctioned individuals. This lack of di¤erence between sanctioning in the two treatments leads us to the conclusion that the sanctioning is prevailingly nonstrategic. Interestingly, we also observe that any form of sanctioning increases contributions to the public good, although unsurprisingly to a larger extent in the treatment where sanctions are immediately observed. We interpret the survival of cooperation in the treatment with possible -but not immediately observed sanctions -as an evidence for subjects' expectations of nonstrategic sanctioning, suggesting that sanctions do not have to hurt immediately in order to work. Observation that subjects expect to be sanctioned for freeriding, although they receive no immediate evidence, illustrates the crucial role of beliefs in altruistic punishment and speaks for sustaining of cooperation in societies where individuals do not necessarily interact in small groups, under constant scrutiny, but rather interact sporadically, with the information on their (uncooperative) behavior having long term consequences, overreaching those of the immediately experienced (social) sanctions.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the game and the experiment design. The data are analyzed in section 3, and section 4 concludes.
2 The game and experimental design
The game
We implement a standard, …nitely repeated linear public goods game with N 2 players and with the possibility to sanction. In the stage game, all players …rst simultaneously choose their private contribution to the public goods game. The payo¤ of player i = 1; ::; N in one round of the public goods game prior to sanctioning is given by:
where x i 2 f0; 1; :::; Eg is the contribution to the public good by player i with i = 1; ::; N;
and X i is the sum of contributions of all players other than i; we denote by E > 0 the initial symmetric endowment of each player, and is the marginal return from the public good, with
After the decisions on the contributions to the public goods game, sanctioning can take place. Each player observes the contribution vector fx 1 ; :::; x N g; receives an additional endowment S > 0; and has to choose what amount of (integer) points from the endowment S to assign to any of the other players. Let us denote by s ij the amount of points player i assigns to player j; j 6 = i where s ij 2 f0; 1; :::; Sg and P j6 =i s ij S: Player i 0 s payo¤ from sanctioning in one round is given by:
Every point that player i assigns to player j implies a "sanction" of 3 points deducted from the payo¤ of the receiving player j at a cost of 1 point to the sanctioning player i.
Player i's payo¤ in the stage game with sanctioning is given by
In order to derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prediction for the stage game with sanctioning played among rational, money-maximizing players with common knowledge of the game and the players'preferences for payo¤ maximization, we …rst note that sanctions are costly to the sender while yielding no direct material bene…t to her. Hence, each player i = 1; ::; N will set s ij = 0 to all j 6 = i: No sanctions will be given and the predicted contributions in stage 1 are equal to the contributions in a public goods game without the sanctioning possibility. In order to derive those, we note that the private cost of one unit contribution to the public good, which is equal to 1, exceeds the private bene…t of the contribution, which is equal to , with 1 N < < 1. Consequently, the only rational solution is to set x i = 0 for i = 1; :::; N . This solution is ine¢ cient, though, as the maximal (and also joint-payo¤ maximizing) payo¤ is obtained if each group member chooses contribution x = E.
Finally, if the stage game is repeated …nitely many rounds, the backwards induction leads to the prediction that no sanctions will be given in any round, and contributions to the public good will be equal to 0 in all rounds.
The assumption of pure money-maximization may be too restrictive, though, and the public goods game with sanctioning might be also played by players with preferences di¤ering from own-payo¤ maximization, in particular with preferences for altruistic punishment. These altruistic punishers do not choose s ij = 0 for all j 6 = i independent of the contribution vector fx 1 ; :::; x N g: conditional on the observed contribution vector fx 1 ; :::; x N g; altruistic punishers are willing to bear the costs of sanctioning to the extent that these costs are compensated by the joy of the act or of the impact of their sanctioning, in whatever way it might be (e.g. by decreasing payo¤ inequalities, reciprocating to uncooperative behavior, seeking to express fairness norms etc.) We will refer to the sanctioning performed by the altruistic punishers as nonstrategic sanctioning.
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Additionally to this type of sanctioning, we argue, strategic sanctioning might take place in repeated interactions when players'preferences are private information. Strategic sanctioning comprises choices of rational money-maximizing players to assign the individually costly sanctions to freeriders in a repeated game because of the impact these sanctions are expected to have on the behavior and the beliefs of the players in the future interactions of the game. This mechanism of providing punishment (i.e. secondary public good)
by rational money-maximizers is akin to rational cooperation in a repeated public goods game (Kreps et al. 1982 ). Sanctions will be provided by rational money-maximizers if the investment into generating the belief that altruistic punishers are present in the population would yield long-run bene…t outweighing the short-run costs of sanctioning.
Note that both nonstrategic and strategic motivations of sanctioning will be present in a game where sanctions received in one round of the game can be related to the contribution made in that round, and when players actually receive information on the sanctions received by players in that round. Let us refer to this setup as STANDARD sanctions repeated public goods game. Contrary to this, when sanctioning is possible but players do not learn whether and who received sanctions during the play of the game, then players are not able to adjust their beliefs about the presence of altruistic punishers in the population, and/or change their freeriding behavior towards cooperation in order to avoid future sanctioning. Consequently, there are no strategic motivations for sanctioning in this case, where subjects would assign sanctions in order to change the beliefs of others. Let us refer to this setup as SECRET sanctions repeated public goods game. The only di¤erence in the STANDARD and SECRET sanctions public goods game is the information on sanctions sent/received, which is postponed till the end of the game in the SECRET sanctions case, but which is available after each round of interaction in the STANDARD sanctions public goods game.
Until now, the prevailing explanation of sanctioning in the literature is that of nonstrategic motivations. We therefore state our null hypothesis as follows:
Null hypothesis (H0): Some subjects hold preferences for altruistic punishment. The sanctioning observed in repeated public goods games is due to the rational, morethan-payo¤ maximizing choices of these subjects. Consequently, the extent of sanctioning observed in the STANDARD and SECRET sanctions repeated public goods game will be the same.
As discussed above, strategic reasons for sanctioning cannot be excluded based on the evidence we have, hence, we state our alternative hypothesis:
Alternative hypothesis (HA): Rational, payo¤-maximizing subjects are also willing to sanction freeriders in a repeated public goods game in order to manipulate the beliefs of others with respect to the presence of altruistic punishers in the interaction. Consequently, more sanctioning will be observed in the STANDARD sanctions repeated public goods game, where this is possible, than in the SECRET sanctions repeated public goods game, where no strategic motivations for sanctioning are present.
Experiment design
In the fall semester of 2006, we ran four experimental sessions at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. In total, 64 subjects participated in two treatments. 4 Each subject participated in only one treatment. The participants were students in economics, law, or business. The language of the experiment was English. Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a computer terminal. They were informed that the experiment consists of two tasks, and instructions for each task (see Appendix) were read aloud just before the relevant task started. The experiment was fully computerized; the software was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) .
Each treatment consisted of two tasks. In Task 1, subjects were matched into groups of four (N=4) and participated in 10 rounds of the repeated public goods game without any sanctioning, with payo¤ function given by Equation (1), using = 0:4 and E = 10:
They were informed that they would stay in the same group for all 10 rounds, but in each round, subjects would be assigned a new label (ranging from 1 to 4). In this way, subjects shared knowledge about the behavior of others in the group across rounds, but they could not identify individual group members across rounds. In each round, each subject received 10 tokens, and was asked to divide it between option I (public good) and option II (private good). All formulations were in a neutral language. After each round, each subject observed the contributions of all other subjects in his/her group.
At the beginning of Task 2, we regrouped all subjects into new groups, and we informed them that they will stay in the same group again for all 10 rounds of Task 2. Also, subject's labels changed again in each round, as it was in Task 1. In the second task, each round had two stages. In stage 1, subjects chose their contributions to the public good. Then they observed individual contributions, and received 10 tokens of stage 2 endowment (S=10).
In stage 2, subjects were able to assign any of their stage 2 endowment to any of the other subjects in their group, and their payo¤ function was given by Equation (3).
The only thing that di¤ered in the two treatments we implemented is the information feedback subjects received after assigning sanctions in Task 2. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, subjects were informed on the number of sanctioning points they received in the same round in which these points were sent to them. In the SECRET sanctions treatment, subjects did not learn anything about the sanctioning points received up till the end of the experiment. Only after all 10 rounds of Task 2 were …nished, each subject robust to the inclusion of this dummy.
learned how many points he/she received in each round.
Let us comment on the type of partner design that we used, and in which the subjects remain in the same group, but their labels are re-assigned randomly after each round. In this way, the same group interacts repeatedly, but under the condition that a link among actions taken in di¤erent rounds is severed, i.e. by preserving anonymity across rounds.
Hence, this design combines two advantageous features useful in our experiment: (i) the observations of sanctioning in various rounds are independent of contributions observed in the previous rounds as the identity of the sanctioned/sanctioning individual cannot be traced across rounds, (ii) subjects remain in the same group so that actions of some subject observed in one round will a¤ect payo¤s of other subjects in the group in another round as well. In this way, sanctioning can be "strategic" in relation to the contributions to the public good, so that a sanction assigned in one round might a¤ect (if at all) both the behavior in the public goods game as well as the beliefs about future sanctioning in the following rounds.
The experiment lasted about 1.5 hours, and participants earned on average 10,70 Euro (including 3 Euro participation fee).
Data analysis
In this section, we …rst analyze the sanctioning in the two treatments in order to address the role of strategic and nonstrategic sanctioning in the repeated public goods game.
Then, we proceed to analyze the impact the sanctioning (if any) has on the behavior in the public goods game.
Let us …rst turn attention to our main question: is the sanctioning observed in a repeated public goods game largely nonstrategic, or do strategic motives play a signi…cant role as well? Figure 1 summarizes the number of sanctioning points an individual sent on average to another subject, while controlling for the di¤erence in the contributions of the sender and the receiver. 5 There is no striking di¤erence between the two treatments, and this is supported by a non-parametric test, according to which subjects in the two treatments send on average the same amount of sanctions for the same di¤erence between the sender's and receiver's contribution (Wilcoxon paired test, p=0.768). The fact that we observe sanctions in the SECRET sanctions treatment is an evidence towards the presence of nonstrategic motives, as is the similarity in the pattern of sanctioning in the two treatments. 6 Before proceeding to a regression analysis, making this point more precise, let us also note (see Figure 2 ) that the dynamics of sanctioning over time supports the nonstrategic nature of sanctions as well. In the SECRET sanctions treatment, where behavior in the public goods game does not change over time dramatically (see also panels (b) and (d) in Figure 4 below), the sanctions remain at the same level over all rounds of interaction. At the same time, sanctions in the STANDARD treatment lead to an increase in contributions to the public good with a concomitant decrease in sanctions over time -however, the sanctioning returns back in the last period of interaction. Inconsistent with strategic explantations for sanctioning, subjects do assign sanctions in the last period, when the cooperation in the public goods game deteriorates, although they cannot expect any long run bene…ts from these end-game sanctions.
While the dynamics of the sanctioning suggests nonstrategic motives (see Figure 2 ), our conclusions cannot be made without relating the sanctioning to the behavior in the public goods game. In order to control for variables which might a¤ect the choice to punish, we run logit regression explaining the decision of player i to sanction another player j. Our dependent variable is sanction ij where sanction ij = 1 if s ij > 0, and
We explain i's decision to sanction j by the di¤erence between the public goods contributions by i and j, x i and x j . The two variables we include are posxi_xj which equals x i x j if x i > x j and 0 else; and negxi_xj which equals x i x j if x i < x j and 0 else. In this way, we allow for asymmetric e¤ect of cases when player j is relative freerider compared to player i; and vice versa, when player j is relatively more cooperative than player i: We also use treatment dummy variable secret which equals 1 in the SECRET sanctions treatment and equals 0 in the STANDARD sanctions treatment.
We interact the variables posxi_xj and negxi_xj with the dummy secret to determine whether the pattern of sanctioning di¤ers across the treatments. Individual and period dummies are included. The period dummies are also interacted with secret to control for possible di¤erences in the dynamics of sanctioning in the STANDARD and SECRET sanctions treatments.
The regression results can be found in Table 1 . Based on them, we can conclude that the probability of assigning a sanction is signi…cantly higher when the receiver contributes less than the sender: freeriders are being punished (coe¢ cient on posxi_xj is positive and signi…cant). Moreover, this e¤ect is stronger in the SECRET sanctions treatment (coe¢ cient on posxi_xj secret is positive and signi…cant). The session dummy secret is not signi…cant.
In view of these results, we state:
Observation 1: Sanctions are prevailingly nonstrategic. Controlling for the di¤erences in the sender's and receiver's contributions to the public good, we …nd that subjects sanction freeriders, and they are more likely to do so in the SECRET sanctions treatment than in the STANDARD treatment.
Hence, rather than …nding more sanctioning in the STANDARD treatment (due to the strategic motivations), we …nd sanctioning is more likely to be triggered in the SECRET sanctions treatment. We suggest that this result might be related to the role emotions play in the sanctioning. In the SECRET sanctions treatment, no feedback is given about the sanctions received. Consequently, subjects are not exposed to the enforcement via receiving sanctions, that would motivate them to adjust their behavior in the public goods game. Consequently, the frustration of the cooperators vis-a-vis the freeriders is possibly stirred repeatedly in the SECRET sanctions treatment, resulting in emotionsdriven motivations to sanction when the same freeriding behavior is observed over and over. This explanation, of course, is open to further research. Now, having answered our main question -and …nding that sanctions are mainly nonstrategic -we now continue to investigate one equally interesting point, namely the impact of sanctioning on the contributions to the public good in our two treatments.
They di¤er in the subjects'ability to respond to the sanctions received. In the SECRET sanctions treatment, subjects do not observe the sanctioning -if any -and hence cannot react to it. Sanctions cannot have any direct enforcing impact on the behavior. Does that mean that sanctions represent a pure social loss in the SECRET sanctions treatment?
The answer is no. Sanctions, although not observed in the SECRET sanctions treatment, do have an impact on the behavior in the public goods game! Let us now support this answer by two sets of results. First, we present nonparametric tests on the groups' average contributions to the public good, and then the results of a regression analysis on the adjustment of the subject's contribution to the public good over time.
The average contributions to the public good in the STANDARD and SECRET sanctions treatment are summarized in Figure 3 In order to understand better this puzzling and rather spectacular …nding, we use regression analysis and control for variables confounding the explanations of our observation. We run a multinomial logit regression explaining the change of own contribution to the public good between periods t 1 and t using data from Task 2 of our two treatments.
There are two payo¤-relevant pieces of information a subject could take into account when adjusting own contributions to the public good over time. First, and in the STANDARD treatment only, the sanctions received in the previous period could deter freeriding. We have shown before that sanctions are related to the contributions the sanction receiver made in the previous period as compared to the sender, and that freeriders are those who receive sanctions. If sanctions do have a deterrence impact, and the sanction receivers are motivated to avoid them in the future, then receiving sanctions makes it more likely 7 The dynamics of contributions in Task 2 of the STANDARD and in the SECRET sanctions treatment seems to di¤er from that of the dynamics in Task 1 (the public goods game without the sanctioning), see Figure 4 . Focusing on group level data, we …nd that in Task 1 (without sanctioning), 6 out of 16 groups show signi…cant (at 5% level) negative Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient between the group's contribution and the period, while the correlation is insigni…cant in the remaining groups mainly due to the fact that subjects contribute close to 0 from the start (no decline is possible).
While the correlation is either negative or missing in Task 1, we …nd more variance in the behavior of groups in Task 2 of the SECRET and STANDARD sanctions treatments. We …nd both groups that show positive or negative signi…cant correlations between group's contributions and the time period; as well as insigni…cant correlations at an initial level of contribution that is above 0.
This variety of the group-based correlation coe¢ cients further corroborate our …ndings from the regression analysis reported below, namely that the public goods game played in the absence of sanctioning (Task 1) is di¤erent both from that played in the presence of SECRET or of STANDARD sanctions (Task 2).
to increase own contribution, and less likely to decrease own contribution in the following period. Second, and in both treatments, subjects motivated by sanction avoidance would respond to their relative position in the group. Contributing less than others, on average, in the group implies that the subject is freeriding on at least one other group member.
If subjects expect to be sanctioned for freeriding and want to avoid sanctions, then contributing less than others on average gives an incentive to increase own contribution. Note that if nonstrategic sanctioning is expected, the relative position in the group is relevant for the formation of expectations of sanctioning in both treatments. Hence, by observing the impact of own contribution relative to the group average in the SECRET sanctions treatment and the STANDARD sanctions treatment, we can measure whether subjects believe that others engage in nonstrategic sanctioning.
In the regressions, our dependent variable; x it ; is de…ned by x it = 1 if the subject decreases own contribution (x i;t x i;t 1 <0), x it = 1 if the subject increases own contribution (x i;t x i;t 1 >0), and x it = 0 otherwise. As independent variables, we include:
(1) variable f inerec which equals to the number of punishment points sent by the others to player i in period t 1 in the STANDARD treatment ( P j6 =i s ji ), and equals 0 in the SECRET sanctions treatment, and (2) variables posxi_xavg and negxi_xavg measuring whether player i in the previous period t 1 contributed more or less than the other players on average, respectively; posxi_xavg = 1 if x i;t 1 1 N P j x j;t 1 > 0 and posxi_xavg = 0 otherwise; and negxi_xavg = 1 if x i;t 1 1 N P j x j;t 1 < 0 and negxi_xavg = 0 otherwise. We interact both of these variables with the treatment dummy secret, where secret = 1 in the SECRET sanctions treatment, and equals 0 otherwise. Our results can be found in Table 2 .
With respect to the overt enforcement, we …nd that receiving a sanction makes it less likely to decrease own contribution (f inerec negative and signi…cant in explaining x i = 1); i.e. sanctions prevent erosion of cooperation. We do not …nd the e¤ect that sanctions directly stimulate cooperation in our data.
More interesting, though, is that we do …nd evidence for the role of expected sanctioning: a subject who contributed less than the group average was more likely to increase own contribution as a response (the coe¢ cient negxi_xavg is positive and signi…cant in explaining x i = 1). Although this e¤ect is less pronounced in the SECRET sanctions treatment (the coe¢ cient negxi_xavg secret is negative and signi…cant in explaining x i = 1) it is still present even when sanctions are not announced to their receivers (the relevant sum of the coe¢ cients negxi_xavg + negxi_xavg secret is positive and signi…-cant in explaining x i = 1). Consequently, subjects who observe that they contributed less than others do increase their contribution, and this even in the SECRET sanctions treatment. Without observing sanctions (if any) for being a freerider, subjects adjust their behavior towards higher contributions, because -we argue -they expect that they are being sanctioned by altruistic punishers. 8 Let us also remark that our main …ndings are stable with respect to variations of the model, in which we selectively include/exclude the individual and period dummies. In particular, in all these variations, the coe¢ cient negxi_xavg + negxi_xavg secret is positive and signi…cant in explaining x i = 1: Subjects contributing less than others on average in the group do increase their contributions in the SECRET sanctions treatment. Before concluding that this behavior is due to the expected nonstrategic sanctioning (i.e. sanctioning which might be taking place but is kept unannounced for the moment), we have to control for the possibility that a subject who contributed less than the group average in the previous round might increase own contribution in the current round due to positive reciprocity. In order to isolate such positive reciprocity motives from the motives of avoiding expected nonstrategic sanctioning, we run one more regression in which we explain the adjustment of contributions in Task 1 and in Task 2 of the SECRET sanctions treatment. In both tasks, subjects choose public good contributions and observe no sanctions, but in Task 2, sanctioning might be taking place. Hence, the comparison of the contribution adjustments in the two tasks allows us to identify the role of to the secret sanctions; i.e. the role of the expectations of nonstrategic sanctioning.
We run multinomial regression similar to that in Table 2 using the same explanatory variables as before, while dropping the irrelevant variable f inerec (subjects observe no sanctioning in the two games we compare). The results of the analysis can be found in Table 3 .
Recall that we run this regression in order to avoid confusing an increase in own contributions motivated by the avoidance of expected altruistic punishment (possible only in Task 2) with motivations of positive reciprocity (possible both in Task 2 as well as in Task 1). We …nd that positive reciprocity plays no role in neither of the two tasks:
(coe¢ cients on negxi_xavg and negxi_xavg secret are both insigni…cant in explaining x i = 1). Having controlled for the alternative explanation of positive reciprocity, we now can state:
Observation 3: Subjects expect that nonstrategic sanctioning takes place. Consequently, when sanctioning is possible, players are more likely to increase own contributions when their contributions are below the group average, even if they currently cannot observe whether sanctions are actually being used or not.
Conclusions
Cooperation in public goods games can be sustained by peer sanctioning if some individuals hold preferences for altruistic punishment. For these individuals, the material costs incurred in sanctioning are compensated by the act or the impact of the sanctioning itself.
We suggest that nonstrategic motivations cannot be fully separated from strategic motivations for sanctioning that arise in repeated games. Under incomplete information on the individual preferences, (some) players might …nd it pro…table to mimic the behavior of altruistic punishers and assign sanctions strategically to freeriders in order to stimulate the beliefs that altruistic punishers are present in the population. In repeated interactions, the costs of sanctioning incurred in the short run might be more than compensated by the gains from cooperation in the long run.
Assessing the role of strategic sanctioning is important as the two forms of sanctioning in repeated interactions -nonstrategic and strategic -could result in di¤erent advice on the design of institutions which rely on the peer sanctioning system. For example, strategic motives of sanctioning would result in advice to design institutions that promote strategic motives, e.g. constrain the interactions to small groups, with a rich feedback on behavior of the group members. As such designs might be costly, or restrictive, the relevance of the strategic enforcement of cooperation by imitating altruistic punishment is of more than of academic interest.
In this paper, we therefore designed a simple experiment of a repeated public goods game with sanctioning with two treatments. The incentives for nonstrategic sanctioning were present in both of the treatments, but the strategic incentives were present only in one of them. In the control treatment, we replicated a STANDARD sanctions public goods game, where after each round, subjects can assign sanctions, and immediately learn whether they received sanctions. In our main treatment, the SECRET sanctions public goods game, the possibility to assign sanctions was unchanged, but the information on received sanctions is obtained only at the end of the experiment. Consequently, all strategic motivations to assign sanctions are removed in this treatment. By comparing the extent and patterns of sanctioning in the two treatments, we can assess the relevance of strategic sanctioning in the repeated public goods games.
We …nd that the extent and patterns of sanctioning are the same in both treatments, giving support for prevailingly nonstrategic origins of sanctioning. Additionally, our equally interesting …nding is the observation that not only sanctions that subjects could immediately observe, but also sanctions which remained unannounced up till the end of the experiment, did have an impact on contributions to the public goods game in the direction of increasing e¢ ciency. The impact that even unobserved sanctions have on contributions to the public good might be surprising at …rst, but can be explained by the role of expectations. We …nd that subjects in the STANDARD sanctions treatment increase their contributions to the public good after they observed to have contributed less than others. This e¤ect is also present -although to a smaller extent -in the SE-CRET sanctions treatment. We interpret this as an evidence for the role of expectations of nonstrategic sanctioning. Subjects try to avoid nonstrategic sanctions -which they expect although do not observe -and this disciplines their cooperative behavior in the public goods game.
To summarize, we do not …nd signi…cant e¤ect of strategic motivations for sanctioning in the repeated public goods game in our experiment. Sanctions are prevailingly nonstrategic, and subjects also expect that nonstrategic sanctioning takes place. Hence, even sanctions which are not immediately observed do have a deterrence impact on freeriding and can enforce cooperation to some extent. Based on this evidence, we believe that the line of research focusing on the mechanism of nonstrategic sanctioning (role of emotions and origins of emotions, neuroeconomic studies) is central to our understanding of the peer sanctioning mechanism, and its institutionalized application in mechanisms relying on it. The evidence on the expectation of nonstrategic sanctioning, and the related impact of unobserved sanctions on the cooperation, opens a range of fascinating questions on sustaining cooperation by altruistic punishment.
APPENDIX -EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS Introduction
You will now participate in an experiment on economic decision-making (the project EDM1). The experiment will last approximately 1.5 hours. You will be paid 5 Euro participation fee immediately after the experiment. Any additional earnings you will make in the experiment will be paid to you next week (and after the participation in the project EDM2). How much you earn today crucially depends on your and others'decisions in today's experiment. Note that whatever you do in this experiment will not have any e¤ect on the project EDM2. The two projects are independent, and have no connection between each other. 9 During the whole experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants. Disobeying this rule will result in your exclusion from the experiment. In this experiment, you will participate in two tasks.
You will earn points in each of them and these points translate into real money that will be paid to you next week.
The exchange rate is: 1 points = 3 Cents; 100 points = 3 Euros.
The experiments consists of two independent Tasks. We …rst read instructions for Task 1, then you participate in Task 1, and then the same takes place for Task 2. Your earning for Task 1 is independent from earning for Task 2.
Task 1
This task has 10 rounds. In each round, you will be in a group with three other participants; a group therefore consists of four participants in total. Note that you will be matched in the same group in each round of Task 1, but each individual will receive a di¤erent identity name, ID 1, 2, 3 or 4 in each round. Figure 5 : Payo¤ Table. For example, participant labelled ID 1 in one round is not the same individual as participant labelled ID 1 in another round.
Earnings
In every round, you will receive 10 tokens. You decide on how many of these tokens to use for a joint Table. Example: Suppose you choose 4 tokens. In the grey column, …nd the row that begins with 4. And, suppose the other three subjects choose 12 tokens in total. In the grey row, …nd the column that begins with 12. Look in the Observe: the number of points you earn depends crucially on the choices of the other three subjects For example, if the other three subjects were all choosing 3 (which makes Y = 9) and you chose 0, their payo¤ would be 10.6, where as if you chose 6, their payo¤ will be 13. Other group subjects a¤ect how many points you earn, and you a¤ect how many points they earn.
We will now explain how the computer screens look like. SCREEN 1 (see Figure 6 ) This is the screen which tells you your ID for this round. The ID will range from 1 to 4. After checking your ID, click on OK to proceed. SCREEN 2 (see Figure 7) Here you decide on how many tokens you will use for the joint project in this round. Use the keyboard to type in one of the numbers 0, 1 . . . 10 and con…rm your choice by pressing OK.
Warning: Before pressing OK, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change your decision after you have pressed OK. After having pressed OK, you will be asked to wait until all experiment participants have done the same. The experiment continues only after all experiment participants pressed OK. We therefore kindly ask you not to delay your decision too much. After pressing OK, a waiting screen will In the upper part of this screen you …nd a table with information on the number of tokens chosen for the joint project by each subject as well as the payo¤ that you earned. In the lower part, you …nd the same information for all group subjects. Click on OK if you are done with checking the information.
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions at this moment. The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody understands how you earn your points. Use the formula or the Payo¤ Table to answer the following questions. After all experiment participants answered all the questions correctly, the experiment will begin.
Understanding Test (after Task 1) 
3)
Circle the correct answer:
1. You are given 10 tokens at the beginning of each round.
2.
You are given 10 tokens only at the …rst round, and in the rest of the rounds, you will chose from the remainders of the tokens from the previous rounds.
3.
You are given some number of tokens from 0 to 10 at random.
4)
1. You will be in the same group with the same 3 subjects for every round in Task 1, and their ID will be the same for every round. The ID 1 in the …rst round will continue to be ID 1 for the rest of the rounds.
2.
You will be in the same group with the same 3 subjects for every round in Task 1, but the ID will be di¤erent in every round. The person with ID 1 in the …rst round will not always be ID1.
3. You will be matched to di¤erent 3 subjects in the beginning of every round. The ID will also be di¤erent between the rounds.
Please raise your hand when you are …nished with the understanding test. We will now start the experiment with two UNPAID TRIAL rounds. Use these two rounds to learn how the computer program works. After that, we will match you into groups and the experiment will start.
Task 2
Task 2 also has 10 rounds. You will be again randomly matched into a group of four. This group will be a di¤erent group than in TASK 1. Again, you will stay in the same group for 10 rounds but your ID will change in each round.
In Task by others -and the total number of points you earned in each round will be given to you only after you …nish all 10 rounds. (We explain the summary screen below.)].
We will now explain how the computer screens look like. SCREENS 1 to 3 are very similar to the screens discussed in Task 1.
SCREEN 4 (see Figure 9 )
In the upper part of this screen you …nd a table with information on the number of tokens chosen for the joint project by each subject in Stage 1 of this round and the points each subjects earned in Stage 1. In the lower part of this screen, you are asked to make a decision on how many tokens from your 10 tokens you want to spend to decrease the earnings of each of the other three subjects. For each subject in your group, you have to put in a number between 0 and 10; the sum of the number of tokens you spend must not exceed 10 tokens. For yourself, you must put in 0. Press OK, when you are ready to continue. A waiting screen will appear. The experiment continues only after all experiment participants have pressed OK, and therefore we kindly ask you not to delay your decision too much.
SCREEN 5 (see Figure 10 )
In this screen you will be provided with all the information about this round. You will learn about the points you earned in each stage of the round and about the points each of the other subjects in your group earned in Stage 1.
[In STANDARD sanctions treatment: You also learn the number of tokens each subject in your group, including you, spent and received in this period in Stage 2.] [In SECRET sanctions treatment: The other results of Stage 2 such as: the number of tokens the other three subjects spent on you, or the number of tokens that the other subjects spent or received, or the total number of points you earned in a round, will not be shown in each round. Only at the end of the experiment, after all 10 rounds are …nished, you will be able to …nd these information about the decisions made in Stage 2.] SCREEN 6 (see Figure 11 )
At the end of all 10 rounds you will obtain a summary information screen with both the information on Stage 1 and Stage 2. In this screen, you will be able to observe all choices in Stage 1 and Stage 2 in each round. You will be able to see the number of tokens you spent to decrease the points of other subjects as well as the number of tokens the other three subjects spent to decrease your earnings, and the …nal points for each round. You can also see this information for all of the subjects in your group, for each round.
Please, raise your hand if you have questions at this moment. The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody understands how the points are earned. Use your Table to answer the following questions. After all experiment participants answered all questions correctly, the experiment will begin.
Understanding Test (after Task 2 …nished, we will start the experiment with two UNPAID TRIAL rounds. Use these two rounds to learn how the computer program works. After that, we will match you into new groups and the experiment will start.
